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Both at the time and since,'. _the ·proposal o~ June 1950 bX
the French Fore~gn Minist.er· Robe:r;-'.t SchU1-nann---that the coal and
steel industries of Weste:r;-n Europe form a giant pool, .under the
supervision of their gover·nments, with the authority to work
out jointly matters of common concern-~-has been recognized as
a master stroke in twentieth century European diplomacy.
indeed it was.

And

The French Foreign Minister provided a bold,

innovative, and, as events would prove, eminently workable
solution to one of the most vexing problems with which the

u.s.

State Department, and Europe generally, .struggled in the five
years following the defeat and collapse of the Third Reich.

This

wa-s to provi.de France and the other nations directly dependent
on the Ruhr---all former victims of national socialist aggression--at least a measure of control over the industries of the region
even after they had been restored to private control •. Or, to
state the matter another way:

it was to supply an international

solution to "The Ruhr- Problem" .on the basis of capitalism.
The striking originality of Schumann's proposal derived in
good measure from the fact that it rested on traditions little
understood in the United states and in more or less ill-repute in
western Europe and-·Great Britain.

'
They
grew out of over a generation's •·

efforts on the part of the coal and steel producers of Germany,
France, and the Benelux nations to work out privately, altho~gh
often with the assent and cooperation of their governments, the
various economic and political problems facing them: as a whole.

·I

I

This

11

bu·siness di.J?lomacy, ". which was conducted

· both formally

and informally, .found institutional expression in, ,but -also went
£ar beyond, .such arrangements as the International Steel Cartels
. of the :late-l:920s and 1930s., _the bilateral agreements of the
.I)epression for regulating coal markets. in· Western Eu.rope, and
the machinery of the European war economy that operated in the
years from 1940 to 1944.

What Schumann proposed, then, was to

·update _such practices in the interests both of European prosperity
and eventual ?ranco-German political reconciliation.
The Schmnann_Plan culminated five years of attempts to solve·
11
-

The- Ruhr Problem" in which the initiative shifted from the

governments of the three Western World War II Allies, _and the U.S.
in particular, to the coal and steel industries of Western Europe.
This transferance wa:s partly intentional---occupation rule was
always intended to be temporary--~and partly due to new mood
engendered by the Cold War.

In the end,· however, it was due to

a lack of better alternativeso - The
ideas for The Ruhr Problem.

U.S.

had simply.run out of

A "European" solution had somehow

therefore to be found.

11.s.

policy towards the Ruhr during the years of Military

Government aimed at both reform and recovery.
.

The heavy industry

.

of the region was-to be purged of those persons and practices which
·(it was believed) had given rise to Hitlerism, restored to "normal"
operation, and then integrated.into the European economy.

But

while these objectives commanded universal agreement in principle,
in practice they proved difficult to implement to the satisfaction
of all-parties concerned ..

This was true with regard both to the
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reo":C"ganization of Ruhl;" industry and its re;lnteg:ration into the
Europea·n economy.
In the first case,· _the ·u .s •· cannot blame the wartime Allies
for fail~re; it "shot .itself in the ·foot."

The reform pr~gram

of OMGUS* was that of "trust-busting.". But as

a

result of·a

dispute of extraordinary bitterness, those representing this
position were·uncererrioniously "sacked,". leaving "practical"
industrialists and financiers in exclusive charge of economic
policy.

Thei:r:- sole aim was to restore conditions of "business

as usual."

The job of reforming Ruhr industry, then, would

eventually fall to the Germans themselves.

Within the i:nan~gement

of the giant. Ruhr Konzerne were, _however, to be found men for
whom defeat was an opportunity as well as a catastrophe, and
t.hey veri t'ably seized upon the occasions it offered to introduce ·
long overdue changes necessary to restore the-competitiveness
of industry.

In short, they managed during the bleak years from

1945 to 1949 to achieve a "nee-capitalist restoration" which,
__;:----,~--~
if it in some ways broke from the past, still preserved the:
essential con·ti_nuity of German business -traditions.
As for the second objective of

u.s.

policy---the reintegration

of the Ruhr into the European economy---it proved impossible
diplomatically __to- enlist the governments of France and Britain,
and eventually West Germany as well, into a workable scheme of
international control.

Indeed, _the French Government remained

insistent on displacing industrial power from the Ruhr, the British
Government faced too many pressing problems elsewhere, and the
*Offi~e of Military Government, U.S.
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west ·.Germans by mid-1948 had_ gained eno~gh confidence to reject .
in principle the ·control of R,uhr· industry by anx foreign_ government.
Instead, it .fell to the leader·s of Rhine and R,uhr to propose to
their French counterparts a revival of the interwar schemes· for
international cooperation.

And, _in the end, political conditions

being propitious, .Foreign Minister Schumann took them up.
In the economic policy of OMGUS a vast gap separated word
from deed.

JCS 1067, issued in April 1945 but made public only

in October, provided the initial "marching orders" for the Ameriean
occupation authoritie-s.

Consistent with a cornmi:tment of Preside,,1t

Truman's from Potsdam, it subordinated German economic recovery
to the provision of reparations in kind from·the Western Zones
as corpensation to the Russians, but also the French,.for losses

suffetred during the war.

The March 1946 Levels-of-Industry Agreement,

which! was to implement· JCS 1067 ,. set allowable output maxima
indu+ry-by-industry on t.he basis of. both reparations. requirement$
and G rmany' s pre_sumed peacetime needs.

1

P:t._ants-" ~n. the armam~n~s

secto,r were to be shut down, manufacture for -civilian necessities
permi,lted, and the output of raw ~terial, coal in particular,
encouraged to facilitate European recoveryc

Such restraints were

never, however, allowed to interfere with German

recovery. 1

Irideed new reasons-·were ·consistently found to increase the limits
on·ojtput to ievels above Germany's capacity to produce, be they,
to prevent famine, cover the material requirements of the forces of
occup[ation, _li.ghten the burden on the U.S. taxpayer, promote
economic reconstruction outside of Germany, _or build dikes against
the ~readed Red T.ide. ·
I

-
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Within OMGUS, however., .. the policy-:-ma.ki!lg process resembled
nothi!lg more than a m~ghty t~g--:--o:e-.-war betweeri the ·advocates- of
"reform first'' and ''recovery first"- in which the latter, _overcoming
an initial disadvantage, .eventually put the former to rout.

The

struggle was fought over those provisions in JCS 1067 which,
as a medium-term objective, _called for. the "deconcentration of
German industry."

This term was understood to mean the break up

'1

Jf the huge trusts and cartels dominating the German economy which
Jere believed to have played a major rc.tle in bringing Hitler to
~ower and in supporting his nefarious r:.i~s. 2
I

Allied Control Council

I

r;iaw No. 9 was a first possible step in this direction.
.

Acting

j

under its authority, .OMGUS seized the assets of I.G. Farben,
i
I

tjusted its management, and began the process of its organizational
dismantlement---measures facilitated by the fact that the
!

headquarters of the giant chemical complex were located in the
'
I

American Zone.
i
'
for

i

Indeed, they had been taken over as offices

the U.S. occupation government!
·The Ruhr, _however, _was in the British Zone and therefore beyond

immediate American reach until 1 January 1947, _when the Fusion
Agreement which created Bizonia took effect.

The U.K. had its

own policy priorities, which it intended to_follow as long as its
own strength vis-··a· vis the Americans_ permitted~
l'ittle in Britain.

"Anti-trust II meant

Opinion with regard.to industrial organization

in the Ruhr was in fact divided between advocates of natiorialization
(as a parallel to events at home) and a return to the status quo
ante bellum.

More important still, .London subordinated Ruhr policy

generaily to a larger concern with the Dollar shortage.
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It .is in l~ght o~ these .con·sider·ations that :qne must view
the actions taken by the British Milita,ry Gover.Ill(le.rit under. Law
No. 52, .which .provided the :1eg·a1 basis :f;o;r;- parallel measures to
those taken in the U. s. Zone with regard to I. G·. 1:1 arben.

It

launched the process of; industrial reorganization in the Ruhr.
Law No. 3 pursuant to it put ''under control" the assets of

Friedrich Krupp---a special measure taken in anticipation of
prosecu~J:on. __ Order. No. 5 provided for the seizure of coal asi:,ets,.
·_;;.

and Order No. 7, thos 7 iri the steel industry~

To supervise·,.
-

-

.

'

the--two·industries the North German Coal Council (NGCC) and the North German Iron and Steel Authority were set up.

Their actual

management was, .however, the job of two German-run executive
arms, the Deutsche Kohlenbergbau Leitung (DKBL) for coal and
the so-called Treuhandverwaltung or Steel Trusteeship as it was
ca.lled in English.

It was intended that. these organizations would

be temporary, eventual disposition of the assets in question to
be determined by Germans themselves.

At the same time, however,

the first steps towards reorganization were taken.

These were

the "separation" of. the coal mines from their parent Konzerne
and "Operation severa~ce," which split up the former trusts and
re-grouped their steel plants into twenty-eight new production
units.

British__motivations behind the adoption of these measures,

including that of appeasing the lµnericans, were practical in
nature.

One·was to restore cost .accountability---a matter of

particular· importance :in coal, _the main reparations.. CJOOd, .whose exportation the British would be called upon to :f;inance.

A. more

imp9rtant one, however, was to facilitate economic recovery.

This
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would require a massive .e;f;Jort at :the top and the ·.enlistment of
all politically acceptable ~erinan leadership_ groups.

In this

connection must be. mentioned the ·provisions made :for the
representation of labor in both German executive ·arms and of
the introduction of Mitbestimrnung in coal.-

Beyond these somewhat

limited objectives, the British had no specific plans for industrial_
reorganization.

The use of Law 52 as a means of decartelizing

.the Ruhr would, in particular, depend less on ·Br·itish policy than
the outcome of the bitter factional dispute that :i;-aged in OMGUS
during the first year and a half of its existence. 3
It provides an early instance of how the triumph of the Cold
war mentality in

u.s.

policy-making circles paved the way for

the eventual restoration of traditional interests in the Ruhr.
The struggle centered on James Stewart Martin, _Chief of the
Decarte.lization Branch of the Economic Division of OMGUS.

His

off ice·- was set up un~er the provisions of JCS 1067 calling for
"the_dispersion.of the ownership and control of German industry."
Although he reported directly to Military Governor Clay, Martin
had few specific powers&

The authority to enact a decartelization

law rested with the Military Governor who, _in the meantime directed
him to" • • • make a survey of combines and pools, mergers, holding
.

companies and -interlocking •directorates" in the German economy.

4

Martin had been selected to run the anti-trust lobby in OMGUS
through the influence of Senator Harley Kilgore of west Virginia
and could count on support .for his activities from a large segment
of the American· public.

The Decartelization Branch Chief, who

had been a lawyer on the staff of the great Thurman Arnold at
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Justice, .believed profoundly in the ·complicity of the German
industrial leadership in havi~g promoted Hitlerism and was also
convinced that the :big businessmen of other nations shared ·,_,,;;
.

the

·nurden of guilto

Martin had arrived as such a conviction

as an investigator specializing in the study of the ways in which
international cartel arrangements had interfered in the
prosecution of the war.

u.s~

In short, _he viewed his work as part of.

a larger effort to rid capitalism of its evils.

His lodestar

was not, .. howev,"!r, .socialism but the restoration of the market
economy.

Alth0ugh he was a strenuous advocate of dismantling

the war-making· potential of Reich industry, and of course
"detrustifying" the giant organizations, there was nothing in
Martin's plans that called either for the confiscation of private
property or the destruction of factories producing for the civilian
market, let alone "pastoralization"

a

la Henry Morgenthau.

As

Decartelization Chief his main preoccupation wa~ merely to prevent
his neighbor in OMGUS, _the Industrial Branch, from f.avoring (by
means·of production authorizations, raw materials allocations,
and the issuance of foreign exchange permits) the integrated
.5

combines at the expense of independent producers.

such distinctions were,·. nonetheless, lost in the bitter feud
waged over the proposed decartelization law in the months from
August 1946 to February of the following year.

Martin had become

increasingly alarmed
during the ea~ly months of occupation by
.

.

'

numerous attempts on the part of officials in the Economic Divisions
of the U.S. and British Military Governments, who were often
prominent figures from the worlds of finance and industry, to restore
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con_ditions of "business as usual" with their Ge·rma.n counterparts.
His suspicions in this resi?ec't wer·e by no means unfounded~

for

example,· _the head of the Economics Division in the ·British
Military Government was Sir Percy Mills.

Mills had last visited

Germany on 16 March 1939 when, as a merriber of the delegation
representing the Federation of B~itish ·industry, he s~gned a pact
of friendship, the famous ·Dlisseldorf Agreement, _with Reichsgruppe
Industrie.

The latter was·the peak organization for business in

the Third Reich.

The Agreement c_alled for an international

"division of influence, cooperation in joint ventures, and, in
_general, _the perpetuation of the practices of "organized capitalism"
6
developed during the Depression years.
Rather than permit officials like Mills to determine what
constituted ;"excessive concentration" Martin proposed a
decarteliza~ion law that would have mandated the Military Governments
to require all German producers to demonstrate (with reference to
fi_rm size, market share, Konzern affiliation, _cartel membership,.
etc.) that they were not "excessively concentrated."

Martin's

boss., a Wall stre·et lawyer in General's uniform named William Draper,
_while arguing privately ,that a so-called "rnandator,y _la.w" was-unnecce·sary
because "the Germans are already on their backs," attempted to
discredit the entire decartelization campa~gn publically. _ Through
press leaks, .German reader.s were lead to believe that. anti-::-trust
policies could be equated with Demontage, the destruction of the
Verbundwirtschaft,-and the wilde:i;- visions of; a Mo~genthau.

At

the same time American readers were persuaded that OMGUS house'd
dangerous radicals, possibly even Reds.

Although Military Governor
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Clay seems to have ha:r;-bored a. cer·tain amount of' sym]?a.thy for
the antitrust a.J?proach and have ·held the brilliant and courageous
young Martin in h;Lgh personal esteem, the outcome of; the dispute
was never in serious doubt.

U.S. Military Government Law 79

of February 1947 and its British equivalent Law No. 78, adopted
the "voluntary principle" as advocated by Draper.

Martin had

no choice but to r~s~gn_and in the following month was replaced
by one Philips Hawkins.

The new chief of the. D~cartelization

Branch was Draper's son-in.-law and happened, .in addition,· to be
a relative of the DuPonts of Delaware.

They owned the chemical

company of the same name, were the controlling shareholders of
General Motors, _in fact the richest family in the United States.
Soon thereafter Draper, invoking the ominous accusation of
"disloyalty

II

fired the 120 remaining members of Martin's staff.

From this point on, the reorganization of industry would be, with
unimportant exceptions, a matter for the Germans to handle largely
on their own. 7
Past practices notwithstanding, _such a possibility should
by no means have been dismissed out of hand, as was apparently
done by the Decartelization Branch under Martin.
'

Defeat hardened

r'

the conviction of many Germans in" • • • the failure of the politicoeconomic models __ of;'the 1930s, ". and thus there was, _according to
a recent article by Henry Wallich,

11

. .

.a readiness·to adopt new

forms (and) as regards policy style a clear turning away from the
capriciousness of the prewar.decade. 118

Germany's. new circumstances

brought to the forefront within Ruhr management itself figures who,
even during the 1930s, ha_d argued untiringly for the long-run

-ll-

neces·sity.

ot

restoring price competitiveness, .it need: be by

sacrifici~g both cartels-and ver"tica.l int~gration.

-As H~go Stinnes.

put the matter to ECA Administratox Hoffmann in a letter of
22 July 1948, I'. . .only fundamental changes will be able to solve.
the coal problem.

The characteristic of Ruhr coal production in

the past has been the existence of an economy of presence, whereas
•

o

.success is dependent on the reintroduction·of an economy of

efficiency." 9

In a formidable personal lobbying effort, _Stinnes

took advantage of his American· citizenship to ensure that s·uch
views as his gained a hearing from·occupation administrators.

On

the steel side, Heinrich Dinkelbach, former ·member of the Vorstand
·of Vereinigte Stahlwerke held similar beliefs.

He was of the

opinion that the break up of his company (which controlled over
45 percent of the_ German steel market) _was necessary, drafted a

I

i
I

l
I
I

plan for splitting it up into components which would then be joined
to complementary production units from other companies, a_nd as
Treuhandverwalter---steel trustee---put into practice _what he
had earlier pr~ached.,
Views such as Stinnes'-and activities such as Dinkelbach's
were by no means accepted universally.

Certain traditional family

interests of Rhine and Ruhr, _in particular the Haniels, Klockners,
and Wolffs (Thyssens, Flicks, and Krupps being temporarily
sidelined), exerted whatever pressure could be brought to bear
on the Anglo-Saxons in an effort to restore the industrial status
quo ante belJ,.um.

The main theme of _their propaganda, _which confused

the functions of ownership and management, was that the seizure
of assets under Law No. 52, and the ensuant elimination of
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of A.ufsichtsra.te and reconstitution of Vo;r;-stande, hampered the
effort to revive production. 10

But this campa,~gn was foolish

and premature. ;The interests of the Ruhr we;i:;-e ·well-served by men
such as Stinnes and Dinke],bach who directed their attention to
clearing obstacles to ·coal production, .reviving the economic
health of steel,· and,- _above all, avoidi!).g all discussion of
"political" issues until the- Americans

_founc;l it., necessary to call

upon German conservatives to protect their land from socialism.
The fact of the matter is that as a result of the collapse
of the Third Reich Ruhr industrial assets had lost-all value and
it could not have been restored without the support.of the
occupation authorities.

Physical damage aside, all firms were in

fact bankrupt in ev~ry but the narrowest technical sense of
the term.

Inflation had eroded working capital to the point where

liquidity was virtually -nonexistent.

Foreign assets had been

seized as payment for reparations. _Stocks were badly depleted,
traditional domestic industrial markets drastically reduced, and
foreign ones supplied mainly on the reparations account.
there were underlying problems in addition:

But

the skewed price

structures resulting from the complex of price controls and tariff
and quota agreements of the 1930s and the secular trends affecting
---·•"

both coal ahd steel markets.

Military Government administration

of heavy industry was, in other words, essential for obvious reasons_
· of finance, supply, _and transportation, not to mention pol~tics.
Moreover, _it offered certian distinct advantages, namely it would
spare the traditional owners and managers the considerable political
liabilities incumbent on readjusting to post-1945 conditions.

One
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of them of course was industrial demobilization--the' Demo·ntage
actions that were the.concomitant of the shift .fr;-om war to peacetime
conditions.

Another was '' detrustif ication" ---the organizational

dismantlement of the larg~, _inefficient production units of the
interwar period.

Finally, _there was the ma,tter of the

"socialization of; losses.". E'or it was -abundantly clear that
Ruhr industry could not expect to operate at a profit.

Stinnes

had a sound·appreciation of these facts, for he said with regard
.

.

to coal "The question·of ownership ·canoe postponed for ye~rs,
as the present economic state of the mines is neither covering
the creditors nor the,shareholders and {is) resulting in
· 11

subventions or .uneconomically high coal prices."

Capitalist

restoration in the Ruhr, _then, was a lengthy and complicated
process involvi~g both the reorganization of business institutions
and the creation of a'political environment both at home and abroad
more receptive to the_ reintroduction of private German ownership
than the continuation of public control in any form.

•

I
I

I

It began

with a kind of diplomatic victory over France in matters of- coal
and steel policy~·
"Coal supply,!' according to the author of The French in
Germany, 1945-1949, "was a major factor ·in every decision that
France took with regard to Germany in the post-Liberation years."
The dependence of the Lorraine steel industry on Ruhr coking coal
was the immediate reason for this concern.

But underlying it

was a consider:ation 0,f far_ greater importance.

German _defeat and

_collapse offered France a one...;time opportunity to become the
economic center of Europe.

In the name of "economic security,"

1

12
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the 1946 Plan provided in particular for the modernization·and
expansion of the Lorraine steel ·industry to the extent of raising
raw steel capacity by 1950 to ·15 million annual tons, and outpU:t
level about 50 percent above ·that of 1929.

The critical corollary

of this policy was the curtailment of future Ruhr steel production.
Control over the-coal supply was to serve as the chief means to
this end.
Not surprisingly, it provided the central feature in all.
French proposals for the solution of "the German question" durin\r
the long tenure of Georges Bidault.

With the exception of the

month from mid-December 1946 to mid-January 1947, he was French
Foreign Minister from Spring 1945 to July 1948.

Bidault's main

theme---strange echo of the Reich's wartime policies towards the
defeated French---was to advocate the economic exploitation of
,

'

Germany for the benefit of her neighbors.

The specific provisions

of the many French proposals of these years i,ncluded, in addition to
foreign priority of access to Ruhr coal, the administration of
the steel- industry by a foreign trust, limits on output of the
product, the creation of an international authority for the Ruhr
and its political separation from Germany, French reoccupation of
the Rhineland,

French ownership of the Saar mines, _and de-centralization

of German poli ti•cal structures.

A national consensus grounded in

recent unpleasant memories of German occupation underpinned these
proposals.

With the partial exception of the socialists, who

advocated a policy of reconciliation based on a more genuine
"internationalization" of the Ruhr and the eventual nationalization
of European industry, it -extended from the Gaullists to the
'

:
I

-

communists.

13
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The ·sole aim of Anglo-American coal policy, as specified
even in the otherwise restrictive 'March 1946 Levels..-of:...Industry
agreement, .was to step up output in the general interests of
European rec·oveiy.

The task facing North German Coal Council,

in other words, was to take whatever _measures were necessary
towards this end.

But if the British could count on the principled

support of both the French and Americans they were not spared
a good deal of criticism in practice~

The. former offered, on

the basis of previous experience, to di~.:ect an international
managerial cadre to run the mines.

The Americans subjected the

British to an annoying crossfire of complaint, accusations ·on the
one hand of doing too little to "denazify" mine management and,
on the other, not enough to raise outpu·to

State bepartment

delegate Walt W. Rostow, who inspected Ruhr operations in May 1946,
expressed the prevalent view that "The British are doing a very
bad job • • • and no good purpose is likely to be served by not
th is
. JU
. d gment . c 1 ear t o
· t h em. .,; 14 He recommended increasing
.
ma k 1ng
the operational authority of German mine managers.
It is nonetheless important notto overlook the accomplishments
of the first twenty months of the occupation.

In the first quarter

of 1945, coal output, previously in excess of 400,000 tons per
day, _had fallen __to about 30,Q00.

Ten percent of production capacity

had been destroyed and another 25 percent presented serious problems
o~ reconstruction or repair,

The mine labor force, _normally

40Qt·Q_00( .ha.d fallen to less than 100 1 0,00.

was particularly extensive:

Damage to miner housi!lg

of 250,000 dwelli!lg units, _some 66,000

were completely destroyed and another 130,000, severely damaged.
Transport and industrial activity was at a near standstill.
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Miner recruitment was the primary objective of recovery
policy.

The British relea:sed from POW camps some 35,000 miners,

all available German labor was. directed to the mines, .and training
programs were set up on an emergency basis.

Thanks.to such

measures the labor fore~ increased by 100,000 men by the end of
,••

the year.

By mid-1946 some 95,000 buildings had b~en repaired.

For reasons of morale as well as physical health, rations were
increased substantially, indeed to above pre-1945 levels.

After

October 1946, 4000 calories a day was the norm • . Labor relation~
also received careful attention.

Control Council Law No. 22

authorized the set up of Works Councils, the miners' union was
reorganized, .and prewar social insurance schemes restored.
reforms would prove to be enduring.
promoted mine mechanization·.

Such

Where possible, NGCC also

Although American machinery proved

to be ill-adapted to Ruhr geological conditions, progress was
made in introducing both the "coal plough" and the German-developed
cutter-loader.

Although in the experimental stage at the time of

German capitulation, some thirty machines were in use by the end
of 1946 and another 23 on order.

Finally, the supply situation

at the mines was improved, although increases beyond the levels
of late '1946 would require the stimulation of recovery in the
manufacturing industry.

These levels, some 180,000 daily tons

(up from 60,Q00 tons in June 1945) represent an impressive
achievement.

Further improvements would depend

on

events outside

the coal s~ctor proper. 15
The revival o·f Ruhr coal production put the issue of its
supply-and distribution at the top of the diplomatic agenda.

The
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French effort· to control it, _however, _encountered a succession
of setbacks that more or less paralleled the eclipse of the
The July 1945 coal directive of.

reform element in OMGUS.

President Truman, _the ·initial policy guideline, _assigned priority
to exports which, during the remainder of 1945 were to occur at
the annual rate of 10,000,000 tons, then rise to 15,000,000 during
the first quarter of 1946.

These targets were never reached, in

part because overall output did not rise. rapidly as expected.·
But the larger part of the export shortfall of 1946 resulted from
the exceptionally high "self-consumption" requirements of the
mines.

This was due to the existence of an open scandal, an

-

understandable one under the circumstances.· German supervisors,
in short, tolerated on a large scale both organized and individual
pilferage from stocks.

Thanks to such practices, coal production

for German use increased from approximately 1,750,000 tons in
July 1945 to 3,750,000 tons in December of that year.

At the same

time, however, France (as of April 1946)_ was able to derive only

330,000 tons per month from Germany of total coal imports of
800,000 tons per month, and total import requirements based on
the low operating levels of 1938 of 1,800,000 tons.

To aggravate

the French coal situation, it was impossible to increase imports
from Britain, which was itself suffering from severe .bottlenecks
because of shortages, or from the United States because of both
.the high costs due to the distances involved and the_ general Dollar
sho;i;-tage.

16

Until February 1947, ~ranee had far less difficulty in gaining
U.S. and British commitments to the principle of export priority
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with r~gard to coal deliveries than in securing the actual
commodity.

A State Department statement of 22 March 1946 reemphasized

."the overridi!}CJ obligation to export 18,000,000 tons of coal
.to the Western liberated countries in the last nine months of
1946, 11 . adding that' "Any increase in the consumption of coal within
Germany should be conditioned absolutely on the satisfaction of
these export quotas."

A joint statement of 23 May 1946 by

Presidents Truman and Goiun fuzzed over the issue only ever so
.slightly.

It noted that France's import requirements of 1,8.00,l)OO

tons per month would increase to 2,500,000 by the end of the pe~_·iod
contemplated by the Plan and that Germany must supply at least
two_-thirds of· the total. 17

Indirectly, however, the remark conceded

Germany's claim to increase total tonnages for domestic consumption.
Events would nonetheless prove such estimates of future export
allocations to be wildly optimistic •. Total Ruhr exports in 1946
amounted to 10 million tons and this figure slipped to 9.5 million
tons the following year due to a transportation breakdown.

At

the same time, however, total output increased from 53.5 million
tons to .71.1 million tons,· the balance being consumed domestically.
But for the French worse was yet to come.

At.the Moscow

Foreign Ministers ,conference of March and April 1947, the AngloSaxons broke with the policy of assigning priority to exports,
replacing it with the so-called slidi!l,g scale.

It gave first

.claim to German requirements, increasing exports from 21 to 25
percent o~ total output as the 'daily rate rose from 28·0, 000 tons
to 370,000 tons.

At the higher figure, the· ratio between domestic
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and foreign sales of coal was just about wher·e i t had been in
the last year of comparable ·operating levels, .1932. 18
·The French encountered similar frustrations with regard to
steel issues.

The slow recovery of the Ruhr industry postponed

the confrontation between recovery and reform.

In any case,

Ruhr raw steel outputs in 1946 and 1947 (2.6 million tons and

2.9 million tons respectively) remained .far below even the 5.8
million annual tons authorized by the March 1946 Levels-of~Industry
agreement, not to mention the 10.7 million of its August 1947
revision.

This rate of recovery actually fell below that for any

other major industrial sector.

It can.be attributed most directly,

as Abelshauser points out, ~o the shortage of ores, particularly
of the high grade Swedish type, but also both to the low priority
of the indu,stry in Allied recovery policy and the availability
of sufficient stocks of semi-finished steel products to permit
manufacturing to take place at the actual low levels of activity.·
It would~ in other words, have been still possible in Spring 1947

-to reduce Ruhr steel making capacity in a significant way without
interfering with the production process. 15
Circumstances should have·been propitious, for the so-called
Transfer Plan which Bidault proposed at the Moscow Foreign
Minister's Conference in March 19470

Its main feature was a

kind of one-sided Franco-Ruhl;" partnership hin9in<.J on the
.

non-resumption
of activity at the foundries of the r~gion.
.

Instead,

Ruhr rolling mills would receive the 5 million annual tons of
new French raw steel to be produced under the Plan in exchange
for exports of coking coal to Lorraine.

The Bidault
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propos.al would_ have ·entailed ver·y heavy costs for the Ruhr.

It

would require railroad· wagons and barges car~ying coke to France
to return empty. · In addition, _blast furnace gas and coking gas
could not have been delivered to the Ruhrgas pipeline network--a loss of two-thirds of its total supply • . Furthermore, new
sources of gas would have to be found to supply the rolling mills
to be put into operation under the proposal.

And they would also

require an additional 1.5 billion Kwh of electricity, which
previously would have been generated on-site from surplus blast
.

furnace gas.

.

In the face of such objections, the Transfer.Plan

could not get a serious hearing from the Foreign Ministers.

Indeed

the increase in Ruhr steel output soon became a priority matter
fbr the Anglo-Saxons. 20

As for the French government, rejection

of the Transfer Plan left it with no policy except, as Monnet
put it, "to fight a rearguard action against Germany's inevitable
rehabilitation. 1121
The rising American fear of communism was the consideration
most·directly responsible for the restoration of Ruhr industry
to private control.

The events of. the winter of 1946-1947 transformed·

what had up to then been merely one of the several· OMGUS policy
concerns into a virtual obsession.

The frost came with exceptional

harshness, causing severe and unexpected setbacks iri the recovery
process~~~indeed reopeni~g prospect~ of revolution and chaos.
also brought into focus

u.s.·

It

fr_ustrations with French and British

policy t?wards Germany and seemed to provide evidence that only
Germans were able to manage their own economy properly.

There

is, .in- short,. _no mistaking the new .tone in American policy.

.Where
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previously the

u.s.

had attempted to achieve ·consensus with the·

Allies in matters German, it now so~ght aggresively, while still
preserving the appearance of unity, _to impose its own priorities.
And first among them was that there should be no socialism, not
to mention communism, _in any future West German state.

The SPD,

at the time commi ted to nationalizing i_ndustry, had, in short,
at all costs to be kept out of ·power.

Two years of intense,

behind-the~scenes brow-beating of the British Labor Government
were required to bring about this resuL:.
ignored.

The French were merely

The issue of public versus pr~_vate ownership, first

broached in coal, was

decided

as a result of i.ntervention·s at

the nationai level of West German_ policy.
coal would provide both an early test of Bizonal cooperation
and a preview of the eventual Ruhr settlement.

The harsh winter,

which created shortages of the commodity throughout the economy,
brought the mines to the forefront of Allied concerns.

The

British agreed with the U.S. that to ra.:j..se outputs the authority
of German management had to be increa·sed.

Discussions over how

best,to do this, however, soon brought into the clear light of
day Anglo-American differences over the issue of property disposition,
HM Government insisting on eventual nationalization and the U.S.
seeking to block it by a deferral of the question.

The matter

came up repeatedly at the "Anglo-:-A.merican Conversations Regarding
German coal· Production II which were coriduct.ed through the summer
months of 1947, and whose immediate purpose was to fit the coal
organizations set up by the British into the Bizonal framework.

22
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The terms eventually arrived at ;f;avored the U.S.

First, strong

new German exec·utive ·arm, . called simply "German Coal Man~gement,"
replaced DKBL. ·Anew US/UK Control Group, a supervisory body,
replaced the British-run North German Coal Council (NGCC).
Significantly, however, _the U.S. delegate to it was vested with
a power to veto any measures tending towards the delegation of
ownership to a public _body.

More important than the U.S. vote,

however, was the fact that the new "German Coal Management" was.
so organized as to increase the already preponderant influence··
of the managerial element in the German executive arm.

Of its

six divisions, only two, welfare, and housing,. were headed· by
representatives of labor; those from the old mining companies
he~ded the ones for production, distribution, supply, and procurement
t'1ng and s t a t·is t·1cs. 23
as we 11 as -f or accoun

The delegation of

control powers from Bizonal authority to such a body would,
in other words, be nearly tantamount to the restoration, in some
form or other, of private control.
..

The de facto domination of the management element within
the German executive arms, of steel as well as coal, ._did little,.
however, to calm the increasingly obsessive U.S. fears of
communism in the Ruhr.

The onsettir1g hysteria is, for instance,

evident in the tone of the dispatches sent from the U.S. counsel
General in Bremen, _whose responsibilities included reporting on
events from the r~gion.

He wa:i;-ned repeatedly and with tir.esome

insistence that the Labor Government was actively conspiring with

i
I

I

the_ union representatives at DKBL and the Treuhandverwaltung
,

to bolshevize the coal and steel industries.

On July 1948, for
j
i

I
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insta,rice, _he reported tha,t
"The ·sepa.ration action ha,s taken a course which
unmistakably turns from priva.te economy to socialization,
The ·originators of the sepa.ration action have
. grown up in the industr_ial bureaucracy, _at the
desks and in the statistical offices of the old
concerns. This bureaucracy now abandons private
economy and concluded a new pact with the labor
union bureaucracy since i t apparently sees the
handwriting on the wall. The result is that
private economy is d_eprived of another key position
as the "Treuhandverwaltung" determinedly utilizes
the power created by the occupation and,·although
lacking any legal basis for it, i~ effecting a
"cold socialization."
·
The initiative for socializing the German iron
industry runs parallel to the,British-domestic plans
for ·:.he collectivization of industry and obviously
origj_nates in the. ideology of the British Labor
·Party. It has developed many steps in advance of
British socialization, in Germany at least, and
seems already to have gone beyond the bounds of the
law • • • • The introduction of bolshevist economic
ideas (is) thus made easy and it is not accidental
that, despite Communist press criticism of the
Treuhandverwaltung, Communist representatives of
the labor.unions collaborate with the Treuhandverwaltung.,
exhorting labor in these enterprises in favor of
separation. 11 24
Such concerns were behind the intervention ·that settled
the issue of private versus public control in the Ruhr.

It

involved a deal between the U.S. and the U.K. concerning the terms

of

the restoration of political control to Germany.

For the

British, it meant the abandonment of any plans for nationalization
in the Ruhr.

In short, the U.K., in exchange for American

assumption of an increased percentage of the occupation costs,
al_lowed the U.S. to "pack'' with conservatives the German
organization which, it had been· ~greed, would. take over responsibility
for directing the economy.· This organization was the Executive
Committe (of Bizonia) which in Spring 1947 was appointed by a
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52-.member Economic Council elected, for its part, by. the Landtage.
The problem, .from the u. S. standpoint, was that the SPD had a
majority on the Com..~ittee and it was headed by Dr. Viktor Agartz,
a Marxist.

To_ get around this situation, OMGUS, having bo~ght

off Britis_h objections, changed the rules. _The Councii, which
elected the Executive Committee, wa~ e~larged to 104 members
with the predictable results that in January 1948, when the
matter again -came up for a vote, the CDU/CSU had a majority and
Dr. Puender of the CDU replaced Dr. Agartz ~s Chairman.

The

"new team" headed by Puender, then, could _be counted on to manag_e
correctly, at least from th~ U.S. point of view, the proces~·of
transferring the industries under custodianship to German control. 1125
These arrangements were worked out under the terms of "Law
-No. 75:

_Reorganization. of the .German Iron and Steel Industries"

enacted 10 November 1948.

It provided for the transition to

German control and sanctioned, indeed lent permanence, to the
"neo capitalist" restoration.already underway in Ruhr industry.
The new iaw stipulated the transfer of ownership from the U.S./U.K.
Control-Group to the shareholders of new, independent coal.and
steel enterprises, and delegated the responsibility for reorganization
to successor organizations of the German executive arms which had
managed the two---industr:l..es since 1946. 26- puender' s. appo.1ntments

to

the New German Coal.M.ini!lg Board and the German Steel Trustee

_Association insured that continuity would be preserved.

Heinrich

Kost, Director of the Rhei•nischwestfalischeskohlensyndikat (RWKS) ,
became the new head of the new German Coal Mining Board.

-Of equal
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importance, .Dr. Helmut Vits, .Director General of Vereinigte
Glanzstofffa.brikeri

AG and a lo?g-time advisor to NGCC was named

chief of the Advisory Committee on the reorganization of the
industry.

The other members of this body included two representatives

of the former companies, two man~gers from DKBL, a financial
expert and member of the Aufsichstrat of Vereinigte Glanzstoff,
- a certified accountant· but only one representative of the
Federation of Tra.de 'Qnions (DGB).

The coal Mining Trade Union

prot~sted bitterly its virtual exclusion from the work of Vi ts'··
committee, indeed" • • • found it intolerable that all basic {coal)
questions are being handled in an obscure atmosphere and that
the public and the workers involved are not sufficiently informed,
let alone allowed to participate. 1127
Dr. Puender's nominations of January 1949 to the German Steel
Trustee Association were similarly weighted in favor of business
_interests.

Of seventeen candidates, only one had been a union

official, and only two oth~rs, both ·accountants, had had union
associations.

The rest represented financial and industrial

interests, _and included Herman Abs of the Deutsche Bank, the
Director of the Business Association for Iron and steel, Dr. Guenter
Henle (a manager at Kloeckner), Guenther Sohl {a Krupp Manager).
Heinrich Dinkelba~h was, predictably, _appointed as Director of
·the new organization.

such appointments, then, _assured eventual
.·
- 28
resumption of private control over Ruhr industry.
What remained
to be worked out concerned the details of the restoration:
number of new coal and steel companies to be created; their

the

-26-

relationship to manufacturing,. _energy affiliates; and marketing
'

.

'

organization; terms of compensation for ·former owners; subsidy
and prici!3-g matters, _labor policy, _and, of course, the relationships
of the reorganized coal and steel companies to the rest of
Europe~
Here there was· less a shortage of ideas than viable solutions.
Indeed public interest in political and economic problem-solving
on a European scale was never greater than in the roughly two
years that followed·the announcement of the Marshall Plan.

At

the same time, actual progress towards European integration was
often disappointingly slow.
shop."

The Council of Europe was a "talk

OEEC was unable to coordinate national economic policies

and had had only limited success in reducing quota agreements.
Only the European Payments Union seemed able to make real gains
towards the liberalization of international trade.

In addition,

much of the discussion concerning European industrial policy
shaded off into -the utopian.

The political bases were lacking

for the integration of European industry on a socialist basis as
advocated at the Westminister Conference by figures such as
Andre Philip and Barbara ward, not·least of all because the
British Labor Government was fundamentally disinterested in
such projects. 2 9--- --- ·
The U.S. Government was no less short on solutions, particularly
with r~ga:I;"d to The Ruhr Problem.

A.gain, _however, _the problem was

less one of ideas than of their implementation.

As early as

May 1946 Military Governor Clay suggested that to reconcile.private
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German ownership of Ru,hr properties and international control
l

that a two-tiered appr,oach be adopted.

It would involve the

issuance of Class A Coµunon Stock in Ruhr companies to German ·
owners, and a Special ~referred Class B Stock, with overriding
voting powers, to the i:"epresentatives of the, Allied as well as
the restored German governments.

The latter would together

comprise a Ruhr Control Authority, with the power to establish
·production levels, control exports, etc.

In June 1947 John J.

McCloy, _then Pr·'.:!sident of the World Bank and subsequently Allied
High Commissioner for Germany, proposed a massive loan, which
his organization was prepared to underwrite, to finance a crash
program of industrial modernization in the. Ruhr undert.aken for
the general benefit of.Europe.

He believed that it would provide

the necessary cement to bond together interests as diverse as
those to be represented on

Clay's Ruhr Control Authority.

In

a personal letter of 7·July 1947 to Under;Secretary of State
Robert Lovett, he emphasized that "Too many people_look upon
Ruhr coal merely as a reparations good and not as the necessary
base for the whole Eurbpean economy.

If all the peripheral

countries had a stake '(in the Ruhr project) as they do in the
World Bank it might tend to create the proper attitude.

.. .

Building strip mills or even road and transportation systems
throughout Europe is just so much unrelated effort until we have
the basic economy which, _both in E!l,gla,nd and Europe, is coal.. • •
I have (therefore) felt that all of the agencies available for
the restoration and rehabilitation of international trade should
.be directed to the sol~tion of this fundamental problem~" 3 o
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The Inte:r;-national Ruhr Autho~ity (IRA) was intended to
provide the capstone of U.S. policy towards German coal and
steel and the vehicle through which hopes such as those of Mccloy
were to be realized.

Established in April 1949 after negotiations

lasting for more than a year, _it set up the machinery for joint
Four Power-German direction of the region's industries.

The new

IRA was empowered spectfically to set production levels, determine
allocations for the domestic ahd foreign markets, and, in general
supervise operations.

In fact the organization never had more

than a shadow existence, merely performing nominally the functions
of various Trizonal coal agencies.

It r.0flected the divisions

that had plagued Allied policy from the first and, _added to them,
came new German objections.

The French National Assembly, first

of all, assented to the International Agreement on the Ruhr only
with the qualification that the industries of the area eventually
be transferred to international ownership.

Moreover, six months

before the IRA had actually begun operations, the MinistersPresident of the various Landtage threatened to withhold their
support 1,mless, as seemed an impossibility, its authority were
extended to cover western Europe as a whole.

The IRA was, in

short, a dead letter and therewith American initiatives for the
solution of the _J~u,hr question came to an end.

31

The new beg-innings towa;r;-ds one, _coming as they did from the
German side, _were necessarily tentative.

In the first _week of

November. 1947, _Dr. Robert Pferdme!lges, _member of the Finance
Committee of the Executive Board, fina_ncial advisor and close
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personal friend of Konrad Adenauer, and director of a private
Cologne bank approached the Comite des Forges through the
intermediation 0£ the De Wendel Family anC\, apparently, Alois
Meyer (the Director of ARBED) in order to make an astonishing
offer.

It was to cede, _as an act of_ goodwill, a fifty perceht

share of Ruhr iron and steel to French industry.

Pferdmenges,

it was established, acted as a result of decisions arrived at
an earlier meeting, which was attended by, among others, Dr. Hermann
Reusch of GHH, Dr. Hermann Wenzel of Vesta, _Dr o Karl Jarres of
!
I

Kloeckner, and Johannes Semler, former director of the Bizonal
Economic Administration.
acted on their behalf.

I

I

I

It must therefore be assumed that he

I

He subsequently claimed to have also act:ed

with the specific approval of Heinrich Kost, _General Director of
the German coal Mining Management.

The French, as it turns out,

begged off entering negotiations on grounds of domestic political
instability and from fear of being branded as collaborators.

Still,

there was apparently mutual agreement during the discussions on
the need for a Frg.nco-German "political solution"

(politische

Losung). 32
The U.S. State Department was·both concerned and somewhat
perplexed about the purpose of the Pferdmenges mission.

The

Counsel General in Bremen concluded that the banker was acting as
an agent of Adenauer and in pursuit of a traditional Rhenish policy
towards France.

Noting Adenauer's recent 1.·emarks about the

necessity of overcoming the French "security psychosis" stemming
from the power of the Ruhr, _the ·counsel General cited two previous
attempts to arrive at industrial agreements with which Adenauer
had been associated.

The ·tirst one.concerned the initiatives of
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the brown coal magnate. Dr. Silverberg in 1925, the second, .the
1932 effort by Cha_ncellor Bruning to reach"7 a coal-:-steel agreemenf---

the latter incidentally also a part of the attempt to take ·over
Vereinigte Stahlwerke, .. engineered by the steelman-turned-,Ambassadorto-:-Berlin Francois--Pon9et. · Hugo Stinnes Jr., .who was not represented
.

,

at· the industrialists~. get-together preceeding the dispatch of
the Pferdmenges mission, informed State that it amounted to merely
another in Adenauer's many·attempts to detach Rhine and·Ruhr from
.

the rest of Germany.

Pferdmenges in fact approached the French in pursuit of a
Appearances and certain public -impressions

to the contrary notwithstanding, relations between the industrialists
of the Ruhr and the steel-producing regions of Eastern France
were astonishingly solid.

They were built on a succession of

successful attempts to overcome the vicissitudes of both politics
and international coal and steel markets, the end result of which
was that, in mariy respects, the heavy industrialists of the
two regions had learned to function, in many respects, as a single
unit.

If this fact was not well known, .it is because the political

risks of admitting it openly were normally considerable.

Concealment

from public view was, in other words, necessary for the conduct of
business under conditions of political conflict, war, .and occupation.

on

the other hand, _eventual Franco-German political reconcili,.ation

· would eliminate much of the need to operate in secret, .indeed would
make it possible for the heavy industry of Western Europe to draw
more effectively-and exterisivelyon the powers of state in dealing
with it:s common problems.

l

.!
. l

l
l

33

traditional Ruhr policy.

i

l
,f
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Even

a.

brief outline ·o~ the history of producer agreements

in West European heavy industry during
the • ·1ate--1920s, _193 Os I
.

,.,

and

during World War II should indicate how, _in fact, they

provided the building blocks upon which was built the European
Coal and Steel Community.

Here one must describe a record of

accomplishment, at the same time remembering, however, that the
historical prociess it~elf w~s extremely complicated and outcomes were
never a certainty.

The first Internat;ional Steel Cartel (IRG)*

was set up by French and German producers,

(with those of Belgiurr

and Luxemburg in supporting roles) in an attempt to overcome the.
problems arising from the excess raw steel capacity in western
Europe.

Welcomed by Stresemann and Briand as opening the way

to the_federalization of Europe, the IRG collapsed in 1931 as
a result of the shrinkage of international markets caused by the
Depression but not, however, without having worked well enough
to be considered worth reviving by the itidustrialists of the various
Western European districts. 35
International heavy industry cartels, _still dominated by
.r

•·

the producers of Western Europe, were a permanent and significant
.feature.of the economic life of the 1930s.

This fact is traceable

in part to the adoption in France and Belgium and, to the extent
applicable, _in ~µxemburg and the Netherlands, _of German organizational
models in both the coal and steel industries.

Great Britain should

be added to the list as well, _thus making her el;igible for the
.first time to affiliate with the Western-European-:-dominated
associations.·

strong Ruhr-like producer associations,and,nat.ional

I

i

cartels_ and new commitments of the state to the welfare of national
•

-*Internationale Rohstahlgerneinschaft

1

I
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industry--:--:--:-these characteristics of "organized ca.pitalism'' on
the German model--..:.made possible in the western Europe and Britain

,.,

of the 1930s .the :t;"egulation of domestic markets and enforcement
of pricing agreements, planning_ of investments, _coqr<iH~a,t±on of
transport and tax policy, .establishment· of common policies in
wage matters, and coordination of exports with sales on the domestic
markets.

35

The second reason behind the strength of international

heavy industry cartels during the 1930s was the combination of
tariff barri~rs and illiquidity, or put another way, the perceived
need to regulate international trade and :payments by means of
bilateral quotas.

Industrial associations had an indespensable

role in determining what could or should be either exported or
allowed to enter the country.

International cartels and bilateral

trade agreements were thus interwoven in a most complex way
determined jointly by governments and producers.

While the

demarkation of authority between the two was never clear, it is
apparent that the close interpenetration of public and private
spheres made it possible, first, for industry to influence national
trade policy to a substantial degree and, second, to rely more
heavily on the state in enforcing private agre·ements among producers.
It is also clear that because of the severe political and economic
problems of Depi:ession · Europe, _not to mention the cumbersomeness
of the economic regulatory machinery, .the -prevailing methoc;ls
could work to the full satisfactton of no one.
The t:t;"adition of cooperation in Western European heavy
industry advanced in two significant particulars during the 193 Os.
First, _,the International Steel Cartel, while remaining essentially
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a joint enterprise of the German, French, .and Benelux "foundermembers, ". did effectively succeed in contrplling international
markets in the producte

Of equal importance, it also managed

to find satisfactory solutions to the various political crises
of the late-1930s.

One indication of the growth in IRG's po.,;rer

was the steady increase in its membership.

In 1935 and 1936 the

producers of Czecposlovakia, Hungary, .and Poland joined, comprising
the so-called "Central European Group."

They were, however, never

more than a minor faction in the overall politics of the cartel.
On 30 April 1935 British producers became associates rather than
full members of IRG, the distinction being due in good measure to
the

United Kingdom's.greater importance as a steel ~arket for

Continental products than as an international competitor.

Finally,

in November 1937 the four largest American steel producers,
represented by the Steel Export Association of the -United States,
affiliated with the Europeans and the British, antitrust laws
presenting a barrier to full membership in international cartels.
Among major steel exporters, only Sweden and Japan remained formally
i

outside IRG.
steel exports.

By 1938, it controlled over 85 percent of international
The steel cartel in fact succeeded both in

maintaining a high steady price level and in frustrating attempts
in_several countries to build foundries and rolling mills. 36
German expansionism, which poisoned the diplomatic atmosphere
and eventually led to wa.r, .actually proved a bqon to the IRG. · It
put Ruhr steel---then producing at full tilt for a domestic market
facing production bottlenecks· due to shortages of- the product--in the ··enviable position of bei~g able to bestow large export
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quotas from areas bought into the German customs zone ·(Austria,
Sudentenland, .and Resttscheckai) on their order:--starved counterparts
in France, Belgium, Luxemburg, .and the Netherlands.

This· fact,

then, provides an important pa.rt of the background both to the
diplomacy of Economic Appeasement and to the events of the occupation
period. 37
The second accomplishment of the 1930s in connection with
the eventual formation of the European Coal and Steel Community
· concerned the combustible.

Franco-German coal-steel problems

were in fact much less tractible than steel-steel.

This was

less the fault of producers, however, than governments.

The

Ruhr normally disposed of large surplusses of coking coal which
because of high transportation costs could only be sold nearby--that is, in effect, to the steel producing districts of Western
Europe.

It probably need not be heavily underscored that one

reason for Ruhr solicitousness with regard to the foundrymen of
France (not to mention Belgium and Luxemburg) was precisely their
vital importance as purchasers of coking coal.

For the governments

concerned, however, the combustible was a potential diplomatic
and military weapon, and it was also in this light that Ruhr coalLorraine steel issues were presented to the publics of the two
nations.

J?oli_~.ical rhetoric aside, international payments problems,

·especially German shortages of foreign exchange,. govern~d the
coal tra~fic between France and Germany during the 1930s and are
at the bottom responsible both for the accomplishments and
.
.
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shortcomi~gs in respect to it.
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The problem, _briefly stated, was that while france depended
on Ruhr coal, its_ government assigned prio,Fity to creditor- over
export interests. -German trade balances thus could not be used
to finance a corresponding amount of French exports to the Reich.
(For understandable reasons, _the French were also unwilling to
accept as payment the overvalued RM.)

This situation gave rise

to what Pierre Mend~s-France termed "L'6quilibre par les bas,"
an incessant racheting downwards of bilateral trade between the
two countries. 39

It reached the point at which in 1936 coal was

virtually the only good passing through the Franco-German horde~.
A significant attempt was made to solve this problem-in early
1937, one brought about by a French decision to step up coal
stocks as a rearmament measure.

It featured the conclusion of

a new Franco-German trade agreement.

Its most important provision

called for the increase in German coke deliver_ies from 116,000
tons per month to 275,QOO tons per month.

It stipulated as well

that "The French have agreed to fil-1 all of the:i.r coke import
requirements from Germany." 40

Reichsbankprasident Schacht, in

the first German ministerial visit·to France since the Machter. greifung, signed the trade agreement on 10 July 1937 at the
occasion of the opening of the Paris World's Fair.

As was the

· case with the founding of the IRG in 1926, _it was heralded as
the opening of a new era in Franco~German relations.

And even

. though the results of the new deal were disapJ?ointi!lg, again because
of payments problems, the hope born with it remained alive--soII\ething which, _to be sur;e, _pr:esupposes a strong willingness on
the French part, to suspend disbelief.
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In the months between the 15 September 1938 Munich Conference
and the 15 Ma:r:-ch 1939 German March on Prague, .the Government of
,,.,
France; .simultaneously with Great Britain, _made significant
.overtures towards the conclusion of pacts between their businessmen
and those of the Reich which, essentially, grew out of the strong
international relationships built up in coal and steel during
'·,

the 1930s.

As war approached they were, indeed one of the few

remaining touchstones of "Economic Appeasement."

Apart from

obvious political disagreements, trade between the Reich and
Britain, as well as with France, had broken down as a result
of the Depression except, by and large, in coal.

Moreover, steol

provided one of the rare international forums in which international
problems were actually being solved to the satisfaction of French
and British interests.

These considerations are what, then, led

to the French proposals of 7 December 1938. 41

They included, first,

an increase in Franco-German trade and, second, the formation of
joint ventures by the businessmen of the two nations in the French
Empire, in Latin America, the Balkans, and Africa.

The French

,.

delegate also proposed the establishment of a binational consortium
to rebuild the industry and-"infrastructures" of Franco Spain.
While these plans did not, because of general German disinterest,
. get beyond the organizatio.n in February 193 9 of a "Centre
Economique J:ranco-Allemande" British efforts at "~conomic Appeasement"
were· somewhat more successfui.

They resulted in the signing of

the Dilsseldorf Agreement of 16- March 1939,

This·pact, which

came at the conclusion of successful Anglo-Ge:i;man coal talks, called
specifically for forming bilateral cartels in every branch of
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industry, and, .in general, .a kind o;f; wo:i:ld economic partnership.
based on the existence of common approache-s to doi~g business on
a basis of "organized capitalism.n 42
German· occupation after May 1940 would provide significant
practical experience in this regard, not for the British, as
fate would have it, but for the French, Belgians, Luxemburgers,
and Dutch.

During the occupation, the industrialists of the

Western European coal and steel districts entered a kind of
unspoken survival pact premised on economic collaboration.

Nazi

rule was not i.1 fact popular in the Ruhr, which is, however,
hardly to say that the coal operators and foundrymen were prepared
to block Hitler's designs.

Indeed, in order to gain a measure

of protection, industry became his instrument.

"Industrial self-

administration" (industrieller Selbstverwaltung)--_;the name attached
to the economic management approach adopted during the Third Reich--meant, in effect, that business ran the war economy for the regime.
With the onset of occupation rule in France and the Benelux nations
it therefore also took over the responsibility for managing the
industry of the so ...called Occupied Western Area consistent·.with
requirements of the war effort. 44
The industrialists of France and the Benelux nations had not
asked to be invaded by the Wehrmacht, _nor were they likely to be
· reconciled to the prospect of long-run German domination.

But

they too were unwilling to resist Hitler, _indeed preferred
cooperation in the New Order so long as their interests were, at
least to some extent, res·pected.

Such facts as the territorial

dismemberment of France, the annexation of Luxemburg, a.nd racialism
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in the ·Reichskoi:nissariat Nie-ae·rlande, _to be sure, subjected to
_ great strains any willingness to collaborate. Such political
,..,
threats added, however, to the importance of the Ruhr as•·schutzherr.
The fate of the coal and steel industries of .occupied Western
Europe was not a happy one.

They operated at huge iosses, were

not modernized, indeed in the case of coal allowed to get badly
run down.

Thanks in good measure to support of the Ruhr, however,

the worst was avoided.

There was no wholescale expropriation of

assets, significant dismantlement of plant, or deliberate financ-Lal
exploitation.

It is perhaps for such reasons that the coal and

steel industrialists of occupied Western Europe provided so little
in the way of damaging evidence at either the "Flick" or the
"Roechling" prosecutions after the war.

It is in fact evident

in retrospect that in various ways· German rule in Western Euiope
even advanced somewhat the process of economic integration:
common institutions were set up for the allocation of raw materials,
organizational structures were further "harmonized,11 financial
"communities of interest" came into being, and "Eurovisionaries"
in both the occupied countries and ·:the Reich had the opportunity
to bruit

plans for future joint undertakings and amalgamations~

44

The political realities of the war's aftermath obscured these
facts.

Although the Dutch and Luxemburgers at times lobbied

vigorously for what amounted to the restoration of the traditional
economic role of the Ruhr, _French foundrymen were obviously not
in aposition to contravene the official policy of their own
government, _least .of all considering that the expansion of the
steel industry figured so large in its plans.

45

All this changed,
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however, once Ruhr-steel's recovery to pre_.war output levels had
come to be recognized as inevitable, for it would open up the
'

'

~

old problems of coal supply to. Lorraine and of excess capacity
in the West European foundries.
in

This fact should have registered

·when the ECA targeted its output at

It did so, however, only in Spring 1949, as it became increasingly
evident that IRA could not work and that the Anglo-Americans
were intent on relinquishing power to the Federal Republic as
soon as possible.
The appointment of Puender's slate of Steel Trustees provided
the necessary cue for the resumption of negotiations toward some
sort of restored International Steel Cartel.

On 15 March 1949

the U.S. Counsel General in Bremen reported that "Rumors abound,
and much significance is read into the activities of such officials
as the French Ambassador, Francois Pon5et, who is reported to
have had recent discussions with Dr. Hermann Reusch, Managing
Director of Gutehoffnungshiltte . . • and a leading spokesman for
the iron and steel industry.

Reusch is likewise reported to have

recently been in Paris, presumably to discuss with French officials
the organization of the Ruhr industry. 1146

By summer, European

foundrymen were reported by Andre Philip to be taking tea together
suspiciously often.

Something important was clearly in the works.

Simultaneously, _the experts o~ the French Plan, .under the
direction of Jean ?,1onnet, _began the draft of the blueprint whose
outlines were revealed in Schum~nn's. proposal and whose details
were filled in during the organizational conferences for the ECSC
which-met in the months from June 1950 to July 1952.

Monnet's

47
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document represented less an alternative to a new International
Steel Cartel than an extension of it.

Planning
of investment
.
~

and production, _coordination of sales, standardization of product,
price compensation, encouragement of rationalization, joint
exporting---these.functions which the proposed High Authority.
was to carry out with the cooperation o~ producer associations
dealt with matters long familiar to them·.

What was new about the

proposal for the ECSC was that now the members of the coal and
steel club could count on the support of their governments
through the High Authority in eliminating impediments to producer
control of markets, and, in ·particular, the smoothing out of
transportation rates, the elimination of tariffs based on the
needs for foreign exchange and of other economic interest groups,
and the regulation of subsidies on a predictable basis.

These

results were welcomed by _the industries involved, openly outside
of France.and secretly within it.

As Monnet points out in his

Memoirs the public opposition of the French steel producers was

a tactical ploy that stemmed from resentment at not being·consulted
48
during the negotiations that led to the formation of the ECSc.
Privately, the men of the Plan received assurances of support
all along.
[

In 1950 there was in fact no alternative to Monnet•s

. "functionalist" approach to solving-the

Ruhr

J?roblem.

The U.S.,

whose influence in Europe wa.s then at an all-time peak,. _had tried
and definitively failed to provide a solution.

J?roposals to solve

it based on international public control of industry, _al though
laudatory in principle, had not the faintest chance of realization
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and were also open to the objection that in the past similar
approaches had not worked.

Given the legacy of the recent war---

..,

to put the matter bluntly, the popular hostility in France to
most things German---the joint operation of a reformed IRA, with
or without the nationalization of industry, .would have been a
chimera.·
But the heavy indu~try·cartels.of Western Europe during the
interwar years, as well as their wartime extensions, represent
a rare Franco-German success story • .They helped make it possible
for the mines and foundries of the region to survive the Depression,
even endure the general organized insanity of the war years.
Understandings between industrialists concerning coal and steel
indeed pro.vided one of the few "contact points" between the Reich
and tne Western Democracies in the months prior to the war,
were

an important source for mutual cooperation during it,

and left a legacy of goodwill which the German side proved able
to draw on after it.

They offered one of the few bases for a

man of Schumann's convictions to build on.
At the same time, the complic{ty of the Ruhr in Hitler's
deeds and the collaboration of heavy industry in occupied Western
Europe during the war·must give one pause.

They underscore the

necessity in ou:1:__ 9wn time bf maintaining, at the very least, effective
public supel;'vision of such o:1='ganizations as the ECSC.
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